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Comment
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church:
Interpreting RFRA in the Battle Among God, the
Government, and the Bankruptcy Code
Susan D. Franck*
In keeping with their religious traditions as devout Protes-
tants, Bruce and Nancy Young regularly gave to their church
in New Hope, Minnesota.1 From February 1991 to February
1992, the Youngs tithed2 $13,450 to their church.' Unfortu-
nately-due to financial difficulties--the Youngs filed for
Chapter 7 bankruptcy in February 1992.4 Because the Youngs
* J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Minnesota Law School; BA. 1993,
Macalester College; A.A. 1991, Simon's Rock College of Bard.
1. Paul Gustafson, Church Can Keep Tithes of Bankrupt Couple, STAR
TRIBUNE, May 7, 1996, at B2; see Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free
Church (In re Young), 148 B.R. 886, 888 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992) (observing
that as active church members, the Youngs regularly attended services and
participated in the church's programs, and that the Church welcomed the
Youngs on the premises at any time), affd, 152 B.R. 939 (D. Minn. 1993),
rev'd, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Troy S. Anderson, Christians v.
Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young): Why Would 'Christians" Take
Money out of the Church Offering Plate?, 4 REGENT U. L. REV. 177, 180 (1994)
(noting that over several years the Youngs gave weekly tithes to their church
as part of their normal religious practices).
2. From the earliest biblical times, tithing has been a common practice
in Judeo-Christian churches. Tithing is the religious practice of donating a
fixed percentage of one's income to the church. Deuteronomy 14:22-29; Leviti-
cus 27:30-32; Luke 18:12; Malachias 3:8-10; Matthew 23:23; Numbers 18:26-
28.
3. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d
1407, 1410 (8th Cir. 1996). The practice of tithing continues to be an impor-
tant part of the religious activities of many religious individuals, but it is not
necessarily mandated by specific churches. See In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348,
356 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (asserting that tithes are not mandatory expenses
but expenses incurred out of the debtor's conviction). But see Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 702 (1989) (holding that payments for religious
services may be mandatory in some instances); In re Bien, 95 B.R. 281, 283
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1989) (noting that the church tithe is a condition precedent
to full participation in the debtor's religion).
4. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1410.
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tithed the $13,450 while insolvent,5 the bankruptcy trustee for
their estate initiated a proceeding to void the transfers and re-
turn the contributions to the estate.6
Ten months after filing for bankruptcy,7 the bankruptcy
court found the Youngs' tithes to be voidable fraudulent trans-
fers.8 On appeal, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Minnesota agreed that the contributions were fraudulent
transfers 9 and further held that returning the contributions did
not violate the Youngs' free exercise of religion.10 The Eighth
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that, al-
though the tithes to the Church were voidable transfers," the
trustee could not recover the money without violating the Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).12
5. Christians, 148 B.R. at 888. The court noted that the Youngs only
stipulated to insolvency for the purposes of the motion for summary judgment
and determining the tithes' fraudulency. Id. at 888 n.1; see also David Peter-
son, Bankrupt Couple's Giving Puts Church in a Bind: Order to Turn Over
Thousands of Dollars Raises Constitutional Issues, STAR TRIB., Jan. 10, 1993,
at 1B (stating that the Youngs kept tithing the same amount despite their
growing debt).
6. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1410.
7. The bankruptcy court ruled for summary judgment on December 17,
1992. Christians, 148 B.R. at 886.
8. Id. at 897. Fraudulent transfers are defined in § 548 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. See infra Part I.C.2. Describing § 548 as a "fraudulent" transfer
is somewhat of a misnomer as the purpose of the statute is essentially to turn
back the clock one year to put all creditors on a more equal footing. The pur-
pose is not to punish debtors for engaging in outright fraud. For a detailed
discussion of fraudulent conveyance law see infra notes 85-91 and accompany-
ing text.
9. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 152 B.R.
939, 950 (D. Minn. 1993), rev'd, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996).
10. Id. at 955. The Church raised the issue of the constitutionality of
voiding the transfers for the first time upon appeal to the district court. Id. at
950. On appeal, the district court did not bar the Church from raising the
constitutional issues and examined whether voiding the Youngs' tithes vio-
lated the First Amendment. Id. at 951-55.
11. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1416.
12. Id. at 1420. For a general discussion of RFRA see infra Part I.A.3.
The Eighth Circuit did not conduct a First Amendment free exercise analysis,
but instead applied RFRA to examine the burden upon the Youngs' religious
practices. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1416-17. RFRA did not become law, how-
ever, until November 16, 1993. Clinton Signs Bill That Strengthens Religious
Freedom, L-A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at A10. RFRA specifically provides that
it "applies to all Federal and State law.., whether adopted before or after
November 16, 1993." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (1994). Despite RFRA passing
after the Youngs filed their bankruptcy petition, the Eighth Circuit could still
apply RFRA to the Youngs' case because the Bankruptcy Code is federal law.
Christians, 82 F.3d at 1416-17.
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The Eighth Circuit is the first circuit court to evaluate the
application of RFRA in relation to tithing, bankruptcy, and
fraudulent conveyance law.13 The interaction between bank-
ruptcy law and the religious practice of tithing presents a
unique opportunity to resolve fundamental issues underlying
the appropriate application of RFRA.
14
This Comment contends that the Eighth Circuit inappro-
priately applied RFRA within the context of bankruptcy and
fraudulent conveyance law. Part I provides an overview of the
history of First Amendment jurisprudence, fraudulent convey-
ance law, the Bankruptcy Code, and RFRA's application to the
tithing practices of insolvent debtors. Part H addresses the
Christians court's reasoning and holding. Part Il argues that,
although the court correctly held the Youngs' tithe to be a
fraudulent conveyance, the court misconstrued RFRA to resur-
rect an overly stringent standard of review. This Comment
concludes that, in determining the scope of free exercise pro-
tection under RFRA, courts should use a functional balancing
test to weigh the competing interests of religious liberty
against the need for effective government administration.
I. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
The First Amendment provides that, Congress "shall make
no law ... prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. 5 Concep-
tually, the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence
consists of three distinct historical eras that vacillate between
emphasizing either the critical nature of governmental inter-
ests or the importance of individual religious liberty.
1. Reynolds to Sherbert
In the landmark case Reynolds v. United States, 6 the
Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits
laws that regulate religious beliefs but does not preclude laws
13. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1416.
14. The constitutionality of RFRA is currently an issue before the Su-
preme Court. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996) (granting
certiorari).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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regulating religious practices.17 In Reynolds, a religious man-
date required polygamy. 8 The Court found the Constitution
does not prohibit a state from criminalizing the practice of po-
lygamy or creating a severe imposition upon religious free-
dom.19 In making the sharp distinction between regulating be-
lief and practice, the Court concluded religious freedom did not
prohibit legislation that controlled "important feature[s] of so-
cial life."20 For nearly 100 years, the courts used the Reynolds
approach to balance fundamental societal concerns against the
need for religious freedom.21
The Court's analysis of government action burdening the
free exercise of religion changed dramatically, however, in
Sherbert v. Verner.22 Under the Sherbert standard of review,
the focus of analysis shifted to whether a government action
substantially burdened an individual's religious exercise23 and
whether the government demonstrated a compelling govern-
ment interest to justify the religious burden.24
17. Id. at 166.
18. Id. at 161-62. Even though the religious mandate at issue in Reynolds
told parishioners to engage in polygamy or they would not gain entrance to
heaven, the Court concluded the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the
government from enacting laws prohibiting polygamy. Id. at 161-67.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 165.
21. The Court had a long tradition of invalidating certain religious prac-
tices and conduct but upholding actions implicating mere personal religious
belief. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) (noting that freedom
of belief is absolute, but the government can place burdens upon religious be-
havior); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (upholding the
prosecution of a religiously motivated mother under the child labor laws for
having her children dispense literature in the streets); Minersville Sch. Dist.
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940) (noting that in certain circumstances relig-
ious freedom must give way to the needs of majority government).
22. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
23. Id. at 403-04. The Court determined that South Carolina's system of
unemployment benefits forced the appellant to choose between following her
religious beliefs as a Seventh Day Adventist and forgoing government bene-
fits, or abandoning her religious practices to accept work. Id. at 404.
24. The Sherbert Court indicated this compelling interest standard is a
very high threshold requiring the government to demonstrate a very grave
and substantial interest. The Court specifically noted that, "in this highly
sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering para-
mount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.'" Id. at 406 (citing
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
[Vol. 81:981984
1997] RFRA AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
2. Sherbert to Smith
Ultimately, the majority of the Supreme Court's free exer-
cise decisions did not use the "strict scrutiny" standard specifi-
cally mandated by Sherbert. Rather, the Court employed a
functional balancing test that weighed the right to free exercise
against the government's interest in enforcing its laws and
maintaining civil order.2 1 In United States v. Lee,26 the Court
defined the administration of a social security program as a
compelling government interest. 7 In contrast to the incidental
burden of paying a social security tax, the Court deemed the
"nationwide" program necessary to accomplish the overriding
governmental interest in providing a comprehensive insurance
system.28 Similarly, in Hernandez v. Commissioner,29 despite
the increased tax burden on religious activities, the Supreme
Court found the government's broad public interest in adminis-
tering the tax code to be compelling.30
Although the Court held that administrative efficiency and
control of fraud may sometimes constitute sufficient govern-
25. In Goldman v. Weinberger, the Supreme Court applied a balancing
test in its examination of a prohibition against wearing yarmulkes against the
military requirement of uniform dress. 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986). The
Court, however, has not always been consistent. In Gillette v. United States,
the court characterized the incidental burdens on individuals objecting to
their draft for the Vietnam war as justified by the substantial government in-
terest in military conscription. 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971). The Gillette Court
found a broader government interest in procuring manpower for military pur-
poses because of Congress's constitutional grant to raise and support armies.
Id. Several cases adopted this functional balancing approach. See Ira C.
Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 183 (1995) (noting different invocations of
this approach).
26. 455 U.S. 252 (1982). In Lee, the social security system burdened an
Amish shopkeeper's religious freedom because the Old Order Amish have a
religious objection to providing "the kind of assistance contemplated by the
social security system." Id. at 257.
27. The Court noted that the "tax system could not function if denomina-
tions were allowed to challenge the tax system." Id. at 260.
28. Id. at 257-58 (citations omitted). The Court went on to find that, be-
cause the social security system has a comprehensive nature, the program re-
quired mandatory and continuous participation. Id. at 258-59; see also Bowen
v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 710 (1986) (noting that the social security program is the
largest domestic government program in the United States and distributes
approximately $51 billion monthly to 36 million recipients).
29. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
30. The Supreme Court denied a taxpayer a deduction for the cost of
training sessions because the government interest in maintaining a sound tax
system is "substantial." Id. at 699-700.
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ment interests,31 the government still had to demonstrate that
the challenged government action was "a reasonable means of
promoting a legitimate public interest."32 This method of es-
tablishing a "compelling state interest" functionally balanced
the burden upon religious freedom, the nature of the govern-
ment interest, and the extent to which the government is bur-
dened by making an exception. 33 Finally, in Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith,34 the Supreme Court determined that the
Sherbert compelling interest test was unworkable.
3. Smith to RFRA
Employment Division v. Smith was a highly unpopular
decision that officially abandoned the Sherbert compelling in-
terest test for free exercise claims36 while suggesting courts
leave accommodation of religious practices to the local political
process.37 Congress spent three years trying to alter the effects
31. Roy, 476 U.S. at 709. In Roy, a Native American father objected to
requiring his daughter to obtain a Social Security number to obtain food
stamps because his religion believed it might rob his daughter of her spirit.
Id. at 695-96.
32. Id. at 707-08.
33. In Lee, the Court noted that government accommodation of religious
practices is an important component of free exercise analysis. Lee, 455 U.S. at
259. The Court specifically recognized that a "balance must be struck be-
tween the values of the comprehensive social security system, which rests on
a complex of actuarial factors, and the consequences of allowing religiously
based exemptions." Id.
In fact, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court specifically examined
the burden of providing a religious exemption and balanced this against the
importance of the government interest. 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972). In Yo-
der, the Supreme Court exempted Amish schoolchildren from a Wisconsin law
that required them to attend school until age sixteen. Id. at 207. The Court
noted that "accommodating the religious objections of the Amish by forgoing
one, or at most two, additional years of compulsory education will not impair
the physical or mental health of the child... or in any other way materially
detract from the welfare of society." Id. at 234. The Court also indicated that,
"only those interests of the highest order ... can overbalance legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion." Id. at 215 (emphasis added).
34. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
35. In Smith, Alfred Smith was fired from his job with a private drug re-
habilitation center because he ingested peyote during a religious ceremony at
the Native American Church. Id. at 874. The Smith Court specifically con-
cluded that the Sherbert test is inapplicable to free exercise challenges be-
cause of its unsoundness. Id. at 885.
36. Id. at 884-87.
37. Id. at 870. In holding that the government could deny unemployment
benefits to workers discharged because of misconduct based upon drug usage,
id. at 890, the Court noted that the Free Exercise Clause did not require Ore-
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of Smith.38 With wide bipartisan support, on November 16,
1993, President Bill Clinton signed into law the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).39
To establish a violation of RFRA, a party must prove that
a government practice substantially burdens his or her relig-
ious exercise.40 The government must then demonstrate that
there is a compelling government interest justifying the in-
fringement upon the individual's liberty.41 Finally, the gov-
ernment must show the regulation is narrowly tailored to ad-
vance the compelling interest.42 Should the government fail to
demonstrate either of the last two elements, the claimant is
entitled to relief under RFRA.43 Congress drafted this legisla-
tion primarily intending to reinstate the compelling interest
test for evaluating state action that burdens the free exercise of
religion.'
gon to provide an exemption for religiously motivated behavior that violated
generally applicable criminal laws. Id. at 881-82.
38. Justice Scalia invited state legislatures to use the political process to
accommodate the needs of religious groups and alleviate any harsh effects of
the decision. See id. at 890 (noting that other states allow an exception in
their drug laws for the sacramental use of peyote and suggesting these deci-
sions are more appropriately left to the political process). Although Congress
did initiate the political process, it probably did not meet Justice Scalia's
original intentions. Instead of individual states weighing the specific needs
for religious liberty and exempting certain religious practices, Congress cre-
ated a blanket provision that provided a greater scope for the protection of
religious freedoms. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-(1) to -(3) (1994).
During the course of debate, Representative Henry Hyde pointed out that
RFRA could not technically "restore the strict scrutiny standard for free ex-
ercise claims" in place prior to Smith. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1992).
39. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488 (1994). RFRA had broad bipartisan support throughout the legis-
lative process. Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TFx. L. REV. 209, 210-11 n.9 (1994). The
House and Senate later approved RFRA in an almost unanimous vote. 130
CONG. REC. S14,471 (Oct. 27, 1993); 139 CONG. REC. H2363 (May 11, 1993).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a).
41. Id. § 2000bb-l(b)(1).
42. Id. § 2000bb-l(b)(2).
43. Id. § 2000bb-l(c).
44. Indeed, RFRA's official purpose is to "restore the compelling interest
test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guaran-
tee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened." Id. § 2000(b)(1) (citations omitted). Further, the statement of
findings accompanying RFRA specifically states:
[In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court virtually
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
RFRA has an incredibly broad application. Not only does
it supersede all prior and subsequent 45 federal laws inconsis-
tent with the new requirements, it also creates an exception for
religious exercise for all laws--on both the state and federal
level--that do not regulate religion on their face. 6 Courts and
scholars have questioned its constitutionality, and the Supreme
Court recently granted certiorari to address this issue. 7
religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and the
compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty
and competing prior governmental interests.
Id. § 2000bb(a)(4) to (a)(5) (citation omitted).
45. RFRA applies to all federal and state law, even those implemented
prior to November 16, 1993. Id. § 2000bb-3(a) to -3(b). At least one scholar
has questioned whether RFRA applies retroactively to cases like the Youngs',
begun prior to RFRA's enactment. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs
Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 261
n.33 (1995).
46. RFRA defines the term "government" to include a "branch, depart-
ment, agency, instrumentality, and official. . . of the United States, a State,
or a subdivision of a State." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1).
47. Several scholars and courts pose significant questions regarding the
constitutionality of RFRA. See generally Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitu-
tional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39 (1995) (arguing that RFRA's remedial
purpose is unconstitutional); Ernest P. Fronzuto HI, An Endorsement for the
Test of General Applicability: Smith II, Justice Scalia, and the Conflict Be-
tween Neutral Laws and the Free Exercise of Religion, 6 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 713, 743-750 (1996) (characterizing the primary problems with RFRA's
constitutionality as the separation of powers and congressional authority to
enact RFRA).
Other commentators suggest that RFRA may violate the First Amend-
ment, Tenth Amendment, or Eleventh Amendment. See Rodney J. Blackman,
Showing the Fly the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle: Making Sense of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 285, 396-97 n.400 (1994)
(arguing that the Establishment Clause, the Tenth Amendment and the Elev-
enth Amendment are all appropriate bases for challenging the constitutional-
ity of RFRA); Patrick G. Kruse, Free Exercise Claims by Inmates in State-
Owned Correctional Facilities: Is Application of the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act Unconstitutional Under the Tenth Amendment, 73 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 391, 428-29 (1996) (arguing that, given the Court's expanded reliance
on federalism, RFRA may be unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment).
But see Carl M. Varady, Returning to Principle: The Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act, in Religious Rights in Prison, HAW. B.J., June 1995, at 6, 7
(arguing the Tenth Amendment does not restrict congressional authority to
pass RFRA).
Some courts have held RFRA constitutional. Beginning with the pre-
sumption of constitutionality, various circuits determined that Congress's ob-
jective in enacting RFRA was merely to "overturn the effects of the Smith de-
cision" and not the decision itself. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d
455, 469-70 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (agreeing that RFRA does not usurp judicial
authority); see also Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1022 (7th Cir. 1996)
988 [Vol. 81:981
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B. JUDIciAL APPLICATION OF RFRA
1. What Constitutes a "Substantial Burden" on Religion
As the pre-Smith case law developed, only certain govern-
ment actions, such as direct and coercive restrictions on relig-
ious practices, were sufficient to meet the "substantial burden"
requirement." Post-RFRA case law is, however, mixed as to
what meets this threshold inquiry. Writing for the Seventh
Circuit, Judge Posner determined that a substantial burden
"forces adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously moti-
vated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that
manifests a central tenet of a person's religious beliefs, or com-
pels conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs."49
Similarly, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have defined
"substantial burden" as government action that forces religious
adherents to refrain from religiously motivated conduct50 or
that imposes a significant constraint upon conduct that mani-
fests a central tenet of an individual's beliefs.5 1 In contrast, the
Fourth,52 Ninth,53 and Eleventh54 Circuits more narrowly de-
(stating Smith remains undisturbed in its interpretation of the First Amend-
ment); Belgard v. Hawaii, 883 F. Supp. 510, 516 (D. Haw. 1995) (declaring
Congress acted within its powers when it enacted RFRA to restore pre-Smith
boundaries). Other courts have found RFRA unconstitutional and held that it
legislates the standards of judicial review for cases implicating the Free Ex-
ercise Clause. See Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 928 F. Supp. 591, 600 (D.
Md. 1996) (asserting that the practical effect of RFRA is to remove the power
to consider free exericise issues from the federal courts).
48. Lupu, supra note 25, at 199. Professor Lupu notes that substantial
burdens upon religious freedom include a denial of freedom to express adher-
ence to one's chosen faith and coercion to act contrary to one's religious be-
liefs. Id.; see also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961) (upholding
Sunday-closing laws despite their burden on the petitioner's religious prac-
tices since it merely made the practice of religion more expensive).
49. Mack v. OLeary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1178-80 (7th Cir. 1996). Using this
test, the Seventh Circuit determined that a prison's refusal to accommodate
the needs of Muslim prisoners during a holy period constituted a significant
burden upon the prisoners' free exercise of religion. Id. at 1179-80.
50. Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68, 70 (8th Cir. 1994).
51. Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995); see also
Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491, 1495-96 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that despite
arguments that their daughter's gravesite was a "place of worship," moving it
did not substantially burden their religious practices because the plaintiffs'
religion allowed gravesites to be moved when necessary).
52. See, e.g., Goodall ex rel. Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d
168, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1995). In Goodall, although the petitioners were forced
to pay for their son's speech interpreter if they placed him in a private sectar-
ian school, the added burden was not "substantial" and merely made the ex-
ercise of religion more expensive. Id. at 173. In support of its holding, the
989
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fine a "substantial burden" as something that prohibits indi-
viduals from engaging in conduct that their religion requires.
To show a substantial burden within a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, an individual must
prove that government action prevents her from engaging in a
religiously mandated activity. The government action must
substantially interfere with a tenet central to her religious be-
liefs.55
Some bankruptcy courts have found that the voiding of
fraudulent transfers under the Bankruptcy Code "does nothing
to prevent the debtors' fulfillment of their personally held relig-
ious obligation to tithe," because the debtor has already tithed
the funds.5 6 However, one pre-RFRA bankruptcy court deter-
Goodall court found that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that simply
because a person has a constitutional or statutory right does not require the
government to subsidize it. Id. at 172. In other words, just because a freedom
is conferred to an individual does not mean the government must fund it or
ensure that the individual realizes all the advantages of the freedom. Id.
(citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) and Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980)).
53. See, e.g., Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) (per cu-
riam). In Bryant, a prisoner brought a free exercise claim contending that the
prison refused to provide him with "full" Pentecostal services. Id. The Ninth
Circuit rejected Bryant's free exercise challenge noting that he failed to allege
any facts showing that the activities were "mandated by his faith." Id. The
Ninth Circuit has also determined that an individual must demonstrate that a
government action "imposes a substantial burden on a central tenet of their
religion." Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1299 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis
added).
54. See, e.g., Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1522 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding
that plaintiffs failed to show a substantial burden because their religion did
not require them to use physical force or obstruction to prevent abortions).
55. Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239,
251 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995) (quoting Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th
Cir. 1995)) (emphasis added), affd, No. 95-1228-WEB, 1996 WL 711319 (D.
Kan. Nov. 26, 1996). In Newman, the bankruptcy court determined that the
fraudulent transfer provision had only an incidental effect upon the New-
mans' religious practice of tithing since § 548(a) does not prevent the debtor
from tithing. Id.
56. Fitzgerald v. Magic Valley Evangelical Free Church, Inc. (In re
Hodge), 200 B.R. 884, 896 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1996). Under this standard, gov-
ernment actions which simply make the practice of religion more difficult are
not constitutionally suspect. Id. In affirming the bankruptcy court in In re
Newman, the Kansas district court recently noted that § 548(a) "interfer[es]
only minimally with the debtors' ability to tithe." No. 95-1228-WEB, 1996 WL
711319, at *7 (D. Kan. Nov. 26, 1996). Similarly, in In re Faulkner, although
the debtors believed tithing was required by the Bible, the bankruptcy court
found that the bankruptcy rules did not "substantially burden" the debtors'
religious exercise. 165 B.R. 644, 646-47 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994). The bank-
ruptcy court specifically held that it was an abuse of Chapter 7 bankruptcy for
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mined that denying confirmation of a Chapter 13 repayment
plan constituted a substantial burden on religion since it con-
ditioned a government benefit 7 upon ceasing a religious prac-
tice5
2. What Constitutes a Compelling Government Interest
Currently, circuits are not in agreement about the defini-
tion of a compelling government interest. Most post-RFRA
courts are willing to find a compelling government interest in
regulating health,59 safety,6" national security,61 and preserving
the social security system. 2 The Supreme Court has indicated
that the elimination of racial discrimination is a compelling
government interest.63 What constitutes a compelling interest
within the context of bankruptcy, however, is unsettled.
the debtors to tithe 10% of their income each month to their church. Id. at
647.
57. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,446-47 (1973) (holding that a
right to discharge in a bankruptcy proceeding is a "legislatively created bene-
fit," not a fundamental right).
58. See In re Green, 73 B.R. 893, 895-96 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) (holding
that it would be unconstitutional to deny a confirmation solely because debt-
ors would be able to tithe under the plan). It is also important to note the fac-
tual distinction between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions. Al-
though a trustee can void fraudulent transfers pursuant to § 548(a)(2) in both
chapters, in Chapter 13 the court must approve a repayment plan that includes
"reasonable" monthly expenses. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1994) (providing that
all of the debtor's disposable income in the three years following discharge
must be applied to make payments). In contrast, Chapter 7 involves a one-
time liquidation of debt. Id. § 726.
59. See, e.g., Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1996)
(noting that public health and well-being have been consistently recognized as
compelling government interests).
60. Another Ninth Circuit panel determined that schools have a compel-
ling interest in providing for campus safety. Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d
883, 885 (9th Cir. 1995). Similarly, the Seventh Circuit determined that en-
suring safety and orderliness in prisons is a compelling government interest.
Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1180 (7th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Circuit also
held that safety and security concerns of "administering correctional institu-
tions" were compelling government interests. Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d
1545, 1555 (8th Cir. 1996).
61. See, e.g., In re Hodge, 200 B.R. at 897 (discussing governmental inter-
ests that are "compelling"); In re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396, 405 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1995) (same).
62. See Droz v. Commissioner, 48 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that permitting plaintiff to "opt out" of the social security system
would interfere with a compelling government interest).
63. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983)
(stating that the government has a "fundamental, overriding interest in eradi-
cating racial discrimination").
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The court in In re Tessier concluded that the government
interests in administering the bankruptcy system are not
"sufficiently grave to deserve the 'compelling' label when bal-
anced against a parishioner's free exercise of religion." 4 Inter-
estingly, other pre-RFRA65 and post-RFRA66 decisions have
held that the administration of the bankruptcy system and the
protection of creditors constitute compelling government inter-
ests.
3. What Constitutes the Least Restrictive Means
Some commentators have suggested that the least restric-
tive means element never actually became part of the Supreme
Court's free exercise jurisprudence prior to Smith.67 In fact,
very few bankruptcy cases have articulated a definition of the
term "least restrictive means."6 The Eighth Circuit held that
this requirement is met when a regulation impinges upon relig-
ious freedom no more than necessary. 69 Other circuits have
indicated that a regulation may be narrowly tailored if there
64. In re Tessier, 190 B.R. at 405. The court indicated that the govern-
ment interests include providing the debtor a fresh start, efficiently adminis-
tering bankruptcy cases, and protecting creditors' interests. Id.
65. See, e.g., In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348, 353 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988)
(holding that administration of the bankruptcy system was a compelling gov-
ernment interest).
66. See, e.g., Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183
B.R. 239 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995), affd, No. 95-1228-WEB, 1996 WL 711319 (D.
Kan. Nov. 26, 1996). The bankruptcy court in In re Newman stated that "the
Bankruptcy Code as a whole [serves] a compelling governmental interest." Id.
at 252 (citations omitted). In support of this assertion, the court noted that
recovering fraudulent transfers "has been a basic tenet of bankruptcy law for
400 years." Id.
67. See Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing
the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TE. L. REV. 247, 282 (1994) (arguing that
the requirement was really just an "experiment" conducted by certain Su-
preme Court justices). In cases where the courts addressed this element, the
least restrictive means requirement "proved basically worthless." Id. In Lu-
kumi, however, the Court indicated that in order to be narrowly tailored there
must not be a less restrictive alternative or other feasible alternative to im-
plement the same government interest. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 538 (1993).
68. One of the few cases that lends clarification is In re Turner, 193 B.R.
548 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996). In that case, the court held that because of the
inadequacy of possible substitutes for controlling fraud, requiring the peti-
tioner to use his social security number as a means of identification was the
least restrictive means available. Id. at 556. Unfortunately, the case is pro-
cedurally different from Christians because Turner involved the fraudulent
preparation of bankruptcy petitions, not fraudulent conveyances.
69. Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1554 (8th Cir. 1996).
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are no feasible alternatives ° accomplishing the same goals as
the contested regulation.7 Similarly, if uniform participation
is required or an exemption would impede the administration
of the program, the statute is likely to be the least restrictive
alternative. 72
C. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND BANKRUPTCY LAW
1. History of Fraudulent Conveyances and Bankruptcy Law
The American Bankruptcy Institute expected that more
than one million individuals-approximately 1% of all house-
holds--would file bankruptcy petitions in fiscal year 1996.11 In
the first quarter of 1996, more than 266,000 consumers filed
for bankruptcy.74 Since 1980, the number of bankruptcy filings
has tripled,75 and 95% of filings today are consumer bankrupt-
cies filed by private individuals. 76 Due to economic losses
caused by bankruptcy totaling $7.2 billion in 1994* and $10.4
70. An alternative is not "feasible" if it presents a potential constitutional
problem. Helland v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 93 F.3d 327, 331 (7th
Cir. 1996). Mr. Helland was a devout Christian who worked as a substitute
teacher and sometimes read the Bible and distributed biblical pamphlets in
class. Id. at 329. The court noted that removing Helland was the best way to
ensure avoiding the unconstitutional inteijection of religion into the class-
room, particularly since tolerating the behavior "would have opened up an-
other constitutional can of worms." Id. at 331.
71. To survive constitutional scrutiny, the government must prove "the
lack of a less restrictive alternative." Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 885
(9th Cir. 1995).
72. See, e.g., Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996). In Goe-
hring, because mandatory, uniform participation by every student was essen-
tial to an insurance system's survival, the Ninth Circuit held that the regula-
tion was narrowly tailored. Id. at 1301. The Ninth Circuit stated that to
maintain an organized society, particularly when a wide variety of services
are at stake, sometimes religious freedom must yield to accommodate the
common good. Id. at 1301-03.
73. See Amanda Walmac, Rising Out of Bankruptcy, MONEY, Oct. 1996, at
127 (discussing the rise in personal bankruptcy filings).
74. Toddi Gutner, The Best Moves If You're Broke, Bus. WV., Aug. 12,
1996, at 110. This was a 25% increase over the same period in 1995. Id.
75. See Hope Viner Samborn, Going for Broke: Soaring Bankruptcies
Prompt Calls for New Repayment Plan, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at 16 (discussing
the increased number of bankruptcy filings and ways to decrease the burden
on bankruptcy courts). There were 331,098 bankruptcy petitions filed in 1980;
412,510 petitions filed in 1985; 782,960 filed in 1990; and 926,601 filed in
1995. Id.
76. Id. About 70% of those who file for bankruptcy file for liquidation un-
der Chapter 7. Gutner, supra note 74, at 111.
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billion in 1995, the steep rise in personal bankruptcies "hits
every citizen in the wallet.""
Historically, Congress aimed the Bankruptcy Code at pro-
moting the following government interests: providing the
debtor with a fresh start," ensuring a fair system of adnuini-
stration that keeps debtors from becoming public charges, 79
facilitating the vitality of the economy to protect public and
private interests, 0 ensuring easy administration and uniform-
ity of the bankruptcy system,81 and protecting the interests of
creditors.8 2 Protecting the interests of creditors primarily in-
volves ensuring that the maximum amount of assets is left in
the bankruptcy estate.83 To accomplish this, bankruptcy trus-
77. Gutner, supra note 74, at 46.
78. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1426-27 (1985) (discussing bankruptcy law's granting
of a "right to a financial fresh start" and whether discharge should cost debt-
ors anything at all); see also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971)
(noting that one of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Code is to relieve
debtors of past debt so they may start a new economic life) (citations omitted);
Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)
(finding that the goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to distribute a debtors re-
maining assets among creditors and relieve debtors from the "weight of op-
pressive indebtedness").
79. See, e.g., Victoria Henges, Canons of Construction Take Aim: Ascer-
taining the Proper Burden of Proof for Fraud Under Section 523(a)(2)(A), 59
UMKC L. REV. 321, 329 n.72 (1991) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 3-5
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5965-66) (discussing the legisla-
tive history of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act and noting that Congress had two
central purposes for the Act: to equally and efficiently distribute assets among
creditors, and to ensure that the debtor will not "be left destitute and a public
charge").
80. See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (noting that
Congress intended the bankruptcy provisions to further both public and pri-
vate interests); see also MICHAEL J. MANDEL, THE HIGH-RISK SOCIETY: PERIL
AND PROMISE IN THE NEW ECONOMY 10-11, 57-70 (1996) (arguing that bank-
ruptcy helps create opportunities for risk-taking, which in turn yields signifi-
cant economic benefits such as the creation of new jobs); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 399-405 (4th ed. 1992) (arguing that bankruptcy
can impose severe social losses which affect debtors, creditors and society).
81 See, e.g., Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 320-21 (1931) (discussing the
role of the courts in promoting the policies of the bankruptcy system); see also
Robert L Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The
Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535, 547-51 (1993)
(recognizing that a collective bankruptcy proceeding increases administrative
efficiency and maximizes the expected return of creditors).
82. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 1-2 (1993) (noting that
although bankruptcy is a debt collection system for creditors, it also helps to
sort out the rights of various claimants against the debtor's assets).
83. See Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bank-
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tees can use avoidance powers to re-transfer assets to the
bankruptcy estate.8
2. Fraudulent Conveyance Requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 548
The Bankruptcy Code codifies the elements of a fraudulent
conveyance in 11 U.S.C. § 548. Actual intent to defraud is suf-
ficient to establish a fraudulent conveyance85 but is not re-
quired.86 The Bankruptcy Code provides a remedy that treats
"constructive fraud" in the same fashion as fraud committed
with actual intent.87 To prove a fraudulent conveyance has oc-
curred, the bankruptcy trustee must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that: (1) the debtor transferred an interest in
property;8 (2) the debtor made the transfer no more than one
year prior to filing the bankruptcy petition;89 (3) the debtor was
insolvent on the date the transfer was made or became insol-
vent as a result of the transfer;90 and (4) the debtor received
less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer.91
Often in the course of litigation, the most hotly contested
issue is whether the transferor actually received "reasonably
ruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 816-17 (1987) (discussing
the traditional view of bankruptcy policy).
84. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 547, 548, 544(b) (1994) (providing the
bankruptcy trustee with the power to void preferences, fraudulent transfers,
executory contracts and other transfers voidable under applicable state law).
85. Id. § 548(a)(1).
86. I& § 548(a)(2).
87. In addition, courts have implied actual fraud via the traditional
"badges of fraud." EPSTEIN, supra note 82, at 368-69. Courts will imply ac-
tual fraud where:
(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(2) the debtor retained possession or control of the property trans-
ferred after the transfer;
(3) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(4) the transfer was of substantially all of the debtor's assets;
(5) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was [not]
reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the
amount of the obligation incurred;
(6) the debtor was insolvent or become insolvent shortly after the
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, and
(7) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a
lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
UNIF. FRAUDUEN TANSFER ACT § 4(b).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a).
89. Id.
90. Id § 548(a)(2)(B)(i).
9L Id § 548(a)(2)(A).
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equivalent value" in exchange for the asset transferred. 92 Al-
though value can incorporate both direct 93 or indirect 94 bene-
fits, indirect economic benefits must still be "fairly concrete" for
them to be "reasonably equivalent."95
3. Tithing as a Fraudulent Conveyance
Since contributions to churches are generally voluntary
and in no way linked to the availability of a church's religious
services, 96 a tithe, by its very nature, is given in good faith and
not for the reasonably equivalent value of worldly goods.9
Economic benefits analysis does not necessarily require that
transferred property be replaced with something tangible or
leviable.98 A tithe, however, often does not even result from the
traditional bargained-for exchange. 99 In certain circumstances,
courts have held that debtors obtained reasonably equivalent
value for their tithes. Generally, these circumstances are lim-
ited to situations where the church requires a donation to ob-
92. There are two distinct issues within the analysis of the final element:
(1) whether the debtors receive "reasonably equivalent value," and (2)
whether the transfers are "in exchange for" the "value." Id. A determination
of whether the debtor received reasonably equivalent value depends on the
facts of each case. First Nat'l Bank v. Minnesota Utility Contracting, Inc. (In
re Minnesota Utility Contracting, Inc.), 110 B.R. 414, 419 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1990); Joshua Slocum, Ltd. v. Boyle (In re Joshua Slocum, Ltd.), 103 B.R. 610,
618 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989), affd, 121 B.R. 442 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
93. "Reasonably equivalent value" in bankruptcy has traditionally re-
ferred to a tangible benefit or an economic value and not merely religious or
spiritual value. Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183
B.R. 239, 246 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995), affd, No. 95-1228-WEB, 1996 WL 711319
(D. Kan. Nov. 26, 1996).
94. The Bankruptcy Code defines "value" as "property, or satisfaction or se-
curing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A).
Reasonably equivalent value does not necessarily require equivalent monetary
proportions to be exchanged. Wilson v. Upreach Ministries (In re Missionary
Baptist Found. of Am.), 24 B.R. 973, 979 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
95. Courts have cautioned, however, that, "[in determining whether a
debtor has received fair consideration for the transfer, the court should con-
sider the purpose of the requirement, which is to conserve the debtors estate
for the benefit of creditors." First Nat'l Bank, 110 B.R. at 420 (citations omit-
ted).
96. Fitzgerald v. Magic Valley Evangelical Free Church, Inc. (In re
Hodge), 200 B.R. 884, 893 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1996).
97. Steven Hopkins, Is God a Preferred Creditor? Tithing as an Avoidable
Transfer in Chapter 7 Bankruptcies, 62 U. Cai. L. REv. 1139, 1144 (1995).
98. EPSTEIN, supra note 82, § 6-49.
99. As one court indicated, very often in Judeo-Christian religions, the
practice of tithing does not include quid pro quo contributions where there is
an exchange of services. In re Hodge, 200 B.R. at 893.
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tain membership"° or the tithe is required as a condition of
employment.
101
11. CHRISTIANS V. CRYSTAL EVANGELICAL
FREE CHURCH
In Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church,10 2 the
Eighth Circuit held that, under the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act (RFRA), a bankruptcy trustee is not entitled to re-
cover transfers to a church even if they are fraudulent convey-
ances.103 As the first appellate court to decide this issue, the
Eighth Circuit defined and applied RFRA's "compelling gov-
ernment interest" standard within the context of bankruptcy
law.104
A. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)
The Christians court first addressed the issue of whether
tithes can appropriately be characterized as fraudulent con-
veyances under the Bankruptcy Code. Noting that actual
fraudulent intent °1 is not required to recover a fraudulent
transfer made within one year of filing a bankruptcy peti-
tion,0 6 the Eighth Circuit analyzed whether the Youngs' tithes
were voidable transfers.107 In the course of deciding whether
the Youngs received "reasonably equivalent value""°' in ex-
100. See, e.g., In re Bien, 95 B.R. 281, 281 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989) (stating
that the church required its members to tithe).
10L One case found the debtor and church received reasonably equivalent
value in part because a church required him to tithe in order to retain his po-
sition as the church deacon. Ellenberg v. Chapel Hill Harvester Church, Inc.
(In re Moses), 59 B.R. 815, 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986). Because of this re-
quirement and the court's ability to easily value the exchanged consideration,
the church was allowed to retain the debtors' transfers of $4700 in tithes. Id.
at 819-20.
102. 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996).
103. Id. at 1420.
104. Id. at 1419-20.
105. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) only requires "constructive fraud" and not an
actual intent to defraud. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text
(discussing the requirements of constructive fraud).
106. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1414.
107. Id. Because the parties stipulated that there was a transfer made
within one year of filing their bankruptcy petition that they made while insol-
vent, the exchange of reasonably equivalent value was the only element at is-
sue. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 148 B.R.
886, 887-88 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992), affd, 152 B.R. 939 (D. Minn. 1993), rev'd,
82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996).
108. To avoid valuing church services, the Eighth Circuit assumed that the
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change for their contributions to the Church,"9 the court found
the Youngs' contributions were purely voluntary and not linked
to the availability of church services. °10 The court concluded
that, because the Youngs did not receive the Church's relig-
ious services "in exchange for" their tithes, their contribu-
tions were voidable transfers within the meaning of 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(2)."' Having resolved initially the applicability of
§ 548(a), the court then considered whether requiring the
Church to return the contributions violates the Free Exercise
Clause and, in turn, whether the administration of the Bank-
ruptcy Code is a compelling government interest under RFRA."2
B. APPLICATION OF THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
Although the Youngs filed their bankruptcy petition prior
to the passage of RFRA,"3 the Christians court determined it
could retroactively apply RFRA to the Youngs' case."' The
court first noted that because the Eighth Circuit "has applied
the RFRA in other cases without questioning its constitutional-
contributions and the church services were "reasonably equivalent." Chris-
tians, 82 F.3d at 1415 n.4.
109. The Eighth Circuit found the district court, "correctly examined 'all
aspects of the transaction and carefully measure[d] the value of all benefits
and burdens to the debtor, direct or indirect,' including 'indirect economic
benefits.'" Id. at 1415 (citation omitted). Building on the notion that indirect
economic benefits must be "fairly concrete," the Eighth Circuit did not define
property or indirect economic benefits purely in terms of equitable rights or
ownership interests. Id. The Eighth Circuit did not rule, however, whether
intangible religious services the Youngs received from their church consti-
tuted a viable property interest. Id.
110. Id. The Eighth Circuit pointed out that the Church provided services
to members and conducted worship services independent of the Youngs' con-
tributions. Id.
111. Id. at 1415-16.
112. Id. at 1413.
113. Because RFRA was passed after the Youngs' bankruptcy case was
initiated, questions about the application or constitutionality of RFRA were
not presented to the district court. Id. at 1412. Arguments that voiding the
Youngs' tithe violated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses were
raised for the first time on appeal to the district court. Id. at 1411. Although
the Eighth Circuit indicated that it was technically addressing the "Free Ex-
ercise of Religion," it did not examine the constitutional issue raised by the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment under the Smith doctrine, but
instead dealt exclusively with the application of RFRA. Id. at 1416-20.
114. Id. at 1417. Noting that RFRA itself specifically provides for
"implementation" to federal laws adopted before November 16, 1993, the court
concluded that it could retroactively apply RFRA since it involves the imple-
mentation of federal bankruptcy law. Id. at 1416-17. The court also noted
other circuits and bankruptcy courts applied RFRA retroactively. Id. at 1417.
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ity" it thus "has at least implicitly held that the RFRA is con-
stitutional.""'
Next, the court addressed whether, under RFRA, the gov-
ernment's act of voiding a tithe substantially burdened the
Youngs' free exercise of religion. 116 Adopting the Tenth Circuit
standard,1 7 the court held that it was a substantial burden.
118
The Christians court emphasized that even though tithing is
not "religiously compelled,"119 permitting the government to re-
cover church tithes preceding the filing of a bankruptcy peti-
tion, "meaningfully curtails, albeit retroactively, a religious
practice of more than minimal significance in a way that is not
merely incidental."12 °
Having established that the fraudulent conveyance provi-
sion substantially burdened the Youngs, the court considered
whether a compelling government interest justified the bur-
den.'2' Noting that RFRA does not define "compelling govern-
mental interest," the court examined pre-Smith case law,
22
post-Smith Establishment Clause cases, 23 and other cases ap-
115. Id. This case did not specifically question the constitutionality of
RFRA. Id.
116. Id. The court noted that under RFRA whether government action
substantially burdens religious practice is a threshold issue for the court. Id.
117. Id. at 1418 (citing Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir.
1995)).
118. Id.
119. Although the Youngs' church encouraged but did not compel tithing,
the court found that, for the Youngs, tithing was a religiously motivated
practice expressing their sincerely held religious beliefs. Id.
120. Id. at 1418-19 (citations omitted). The court also indicated it con-
strued "substantial burden" broadly in order to be consistent with RFRA's
stated purpose of restoring pre-Smith free exercise standards of evaluation.
Id at 1418.
12L See id. at 1419-20 (applying RFRA to the Youngs' case).
122. The Christians court specifically referred to Hernandez and indicated
that the "government has a compelling interest in maintaining the tax sys-
tem." Id. at 1419 (citing Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989)). The court also indicated the "government has a compelling interest in
enforcing participation in the social security system." Id. (citing United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1982)). It also found the government has
a compelling interest in maintaining national security, public safety and pro-
viding public education. Id. (citations omitted). In contrast, the court pointed
out that Sherbert found no compelling governmental interest in preventing
fraud within the unemployment compensation system. Id. (citing Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)).
123. The court noted that post-Smith cases described compelling govern-
mental interests as interests of the highest order. Id. at 1418.
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plying RFRA. 124 Relying heavily on In re Tessier,125 a Montana
bankruptcy case that interpreted the compelling interest re-
quirement to include "'only those interests pertaining to sur-
vival of the republic or the physical safety of its citizens,'" 126 the
court found bankruptcy is not a government interest compara-
ble to national security or public safety.27  Conceding that
giving debtors a fresh start and protecting the interests of
creditors is important, 128 the court nevertheless held. that these
interests are not comparable to collecting revenue through the
tax system or ensuring the fiscal integrity of the social security
system.129 Ultimately, the Christians court determined that no
compelling government interest warranted the substantial
burden on the Youngs' free exercise of religion. 3 ' Accordingly,
the trustee was not entitled to recover the $13,450 from Crys-
tal Evangelical Free Church.' 31
124. Similar to pre-Smith case law, the Christians court noted that cases
applying RFRA have held that there is a compelling interest in enforcing par-
ticipation in the social security system. Id. (citing Droz v. Commissioner, 48
F.3d 1120, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court also noted that maintaining
safety and security in prisons and schools constituted a compelling govern-
ment interest. Id.
125. Although the Christians court agreed with Tessier's analysis of what
constitutes a compelling government interest, the Eighth Circuit ignored the
Tessier court's ultimate holding that RFRA was unconstitutional. Id. at 1420.
126. Id. (quoting In re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396, 405 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995)).
Although the court noted that, as a Chapter 13 case, Tessier is procedurally
different from the Youngs' case, it also noted that it was substantively quite
similar. Id.
127. Similar to Tessier, Christians found that although the government
clearly has interests in providing a debtor with a fresh start, protecting the
interests of creditors, and efficiently administering bankruptcy cases, these
are not "sufficiently grave to deserve the 'compelling' label when balanced
against a parishioner's free exercise of religion." Id. (citation omitted).
128. Id. at 1419-20 (citing Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re
Newman), 183 B.R. 239, 252 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995)).
129. Reasoning that an exemption would be limited to the debtor's credi-
tors, the court found that allowing an exemption did not undermine the in-
tegrity of the bankruptcy system as a whole. Id. at 1420.
130. The court found that because there was no "compelling" government
interest, it did not need to consider whether the governmental action is the
least restrictive means available of furthering the government interest. Id.
131. Id.
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IlI. CHRISTIANS V. CRYSTAL EVANGELICAL FREE
CHURCH: AN UNCOMPELLING VERSION OF THE
"COMPELLING INTEREST" TEST
Although the Christians court correctly decided the
Youngs' tithes were fraudulent conveyances under the Bank-
ruptcy Code,132 Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church
sets a dangerous precedent for interpreting RFRA in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. First, the court's determination that a ret-
roactive action was a substantial burden on the Youngs' free
exercise of religion'33 ignores the fact that retroactive voiding
only applies in extremely limited circumstances, creates a
minimal interference with their ability to tithe, and merely
makes their current religious practice more expensive. Second,
the Christians court construed the compelling government in-
terest test too narrowly.13 1 In doing so, the court failed to give
adequate consideration to the importance of efficiently admin-
istering the Bankruptcy Code to effectively meet public and
private interests. Finally, by declining to engage in statutory
interpretation, 135 the Christians court failed to provide a
meaningful analysis of RFRA. Consequently, future courts
should reject Christians and instead apply RFRA as a func-
tional balancing test. This approach appropriately considers
the competing interests of religious debtors and the public in-
terests underlying the Bankruptcy Code.
A. TITHING AS A FAIUDULENT CONVEYANCE
Relying upon its conclusion that the Youngs' religious tithe
was not given "in exchange for" consideration, the Christians
court correctly determined that the Youngs' gratuitous transfer
constituted a fraudulent conveyance under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2).
Even though the court failed to adequately address whether
the Youngs received "reasonably equivalent value,"136 the court
132. See supra notes 105-111 and accompanying text (discussing the Chris-
tians court's fraudulent conveyance analysis of the Youngs' tithe).
133. See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text (discussing the Chris-
tians coures finding the Youngs were substantially burdened even though
there was only a retroactive application upon completed religious obser-
vances).
134 See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing the high
threshold the Christians court adopts for finding a compelling interest).
135. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (noting that the Christians
court specifically declined to consider the constitutionality of RFRA).
136. Although the court noted that "reasonably equivalent value" can be
direct or indirect, it failed to adequately discuss whether the religious benefits
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properly examined whether the transfer involved a quid pro
quo exchange. Unlike In re Moses, where a church required an
individual to tithe in order to maintain his official position as
deacon, 137 the Youngs' tithes were not linked to employment or
the receipt of church services. Further, because the Church did
not require its members to tithe, the Youngs did not bargain
for the religious services provided by their church and instead
gave the money of their own free will. Under this rationale,
there is no bargained-for consideration that meets the statu-
tory requirement that the transfer be "in exchange" for
value. 138  Consequently, the Youngs' tithes fell within the
statutory definition of a fraudulent conveyance.
B. MISAPPLICATION OF THE SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN TEST
To examine what constitutes a "substantial burden,"139
"compelling government interest,"14°  or "least restrictive
means,"141 future courts should look to previous First Amend-
are concrete enough to have a definite economic value. Here, there is no evi-
dence that intangible religious satisfaction or the personal happiness obtained
from fulfilling a religious practice is "concrete." Cf Morris v. Midway S. Bap-
tist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239, 247-48 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995)
(finding that the court cannot put a value on the services and intangible sup-
port offered by a church since "spiritual value" cannot be given a dollar value),
aff'd, No. 95-1228-WEB, 1996 WL 711319 (D. Kan. Nov. 26, 1996). Similarly,
the court ignored precedent indicating spiritual satisfaction cannot constitute
"reasonably equivalent" value. See supra note 93 and accompanying text
(noting that a "reasonably equivalent value" has traditionally referred to a
tangible economic benefit). Although the court could easily determine the
value the Church obtained by examining the amount of money they received,
there is no similar indicia that the Youngs' received some type of concrete
value.
Even though the Youngs did receive services from the Church, there is no
evidence these services were directly related to the Youngs' tithing practices.
Therefore, the court's assumption that these values are "reasonably equiva-
lent" is flawed. If, however, the Youngs demonstrate a direct relationship be-
tween the tithes and the services provided and a bargained-for exchange, it
may be possible to evaluate the services provided by a church, such as coun-
seling, in terms of their fair market value to determine if these linked values
are reasonably equivalent. See, e.g., Ellenberg v. Chapel Hill Harvester
Church, Inc. (In re Moses), 59 B.R. 815, 818-19 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986).
137. See supra note 101 (describing the holding of In re Moses).
138. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text (describing the lim-
ited circumstances in which courts have found tithing to be a reasonably
equivalent exchange).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (1994).
140. Id. § 2000bb-l(b)(1).
141. Id. § 2000bb-1(b)(2).
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ment free exercise case law.142 Unfortunately, the Christians
court inappropriately discounted controlling free exercise ju-
risprudence and inappropriately relied primarily on one post-
RFRA decision.
143
1. Substantial Burden upon Religion
The Christians court created an overly broad standard for
determining what constitutes a "substantial burden"144 ignor-
ing pre-RFRA and post-RFRA cases which held that simply
making a religious practice more expensive does not create a
significant burden upon religion.145 To the extent that voiding
a past tithe creates an obligation for the Youngs to provide
more money to their church in the future, § 548(a) merely
makes the Youngs' current religious practices more expen-
sive.146 Because the government is not required to subsidize
constitutionally guaranteed rights, a mere increase in the cost
of tithing cannot be a substantial burden upon religion.147
The Christians court also glossed over the issue of whether
a provision limiting religious exercise after the fact can create
a substantial burden. 148 Merely because the court felt § 548
would "effectively prevent the debtors from tithing." it deter-
mined that a government act affecting a completed religious
practice created a substantial burden. 14 9 The court ignored,
however, that § 548(a)(2) did not prevent the Youngs' tithing.15 0
142. See supra notes 16-35 and accompanying text (discussing First
Amendment jurisprudence prior to the passage of RFRA).
143. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d
1407, 1418-20 (8th Cir. 1996).
144. Id. at 1418. But cf Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 680-81
(1989) (noting that contributions to the Church of Scientology were required
by practitioners); In re Gaukler, 63 B.R. 224, 225 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986)
(discussing that the Worldwide Church of God requires its members to tithe
10% to the church).
145. See supra note 52 (noting that burdening an individual's religious
freedom by making exercise more expensive is not sufficient to rise to the
level of a "substantial burden" upon religious practice).
146. Moreover, simply because a freedom has been granted by the consti-
tution does not necessarily mean that the individual must realize all the ad-
vantages of the freedom-particularly when economic concerns are impli-
cated. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text (discussing the
limitations on religious freedom wrought by the Reynolds decision).
147. See supra note 52 (discussing the Goodall holding).
148. The Christians court gave only the briefest mention to the issue of
retroactivity as a substantial burden. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1418-20.
149. Id.
150. Despite the coures theoretical assertion that § 548 affected the
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As in In re Newman, the Youngs already freely exercised their
religion by placing money in the church offering plate.'
Additionally, there is no substantial burden upon the
Youngs' religious exercise because they filed a Chapter 7 peti-
tion. Under a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, a court can re-
ject a reorganization plan and prevent the debtor from tithing
over the course of the plan if it believes a debtor's proposed
tithes are not reasonably necessary.1 12 Voiding a transfer in a
Chapter 7 liquidation, however, attacks a third party and not
the current tithing. practices of a religious debtor. Instead of
burdening the Youngs' previous religious observances, the
trustee is merely requesting that the Church return money to
the bankruptcy estate. 53 Consequently, voiding a "fraudulent
transfer" in a Chapter 7 liquidation does not have the same ef-
fect upon a debtor's religious practices1 54 as conditioning the
approval of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan upon the cessation
of a religious activity. 55
Youngs' tithing practices, id., the Youngs continued to tithe in the year prior
to filing their bankruptcy petition. Id. at 1410.
151. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (noting the In re Hodge
court's determination that there is no substantial burden upon religion since
the funds the trustee sought to recover were already tithed).
152. See supra note 58 (discussing the procedural differences between a
Chapter 13 reorganization and a Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy).
153. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994); see supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the process of
proving a fraudulent conveyance).
154. The important part of tithing involves the good-faith, free-will trans-
fer of property to the church as paying homage to God. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text (describing the nature of tithing). Technically, the Youngs
have already engaged in this transfer and paid their respects to God. For the
purposes of Chapter 7, their religiously motivated practices are complete.
Voiding the transfer does not punish the Youngs for tithing-there are no
punitive penalties attached. Instead, it merely recoups the money from a
third party. This is a separate and distinct question from whether the re-
moval of money from a church's bank account burdens its ability to freely
practice religion and minister to the needs of its congregation.
155. Specifically in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the court's approval of a
bankruptcy plan is contingent upon the court finding that the monthly ex-
penses are "reasonably necessary." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2). Currently, courts
are split as to whether tithing is a reasonably necessary expense. While some
courts have approved plans which include "reasonable" tithes, other courts
have denied approval of Chapter 13 reorganization plans. See supra note 58
and accompanying text (discussing how courts have dealt with tithing under
Chapter 13).
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2. Compelling Government Interest
The conflict in Christians-particularly within the context
of bankruptcy law-provides a rare opportunity to reconcile the
competing policy considerations underlying the Free Exercise
Clause and set standards for defining a "compelling govern-
ment interest." Although the court correctly noted RFRA does
not define "compelling interest,"156 the Christians court inap-
propriately determined that compelling interests can only be
those of the highest order-national security or public safety.157
Initially, the court relied upon Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye v. City of Hialeah58 to support the assertion that only na-
tional security or public safety are compelling government in-
terests.159 The court failed, however, to note that Lukumi did
not involve a generally applicable statute, such as the Bank-
ruptcy Code, but an ordinance discriminating against a specific
religion. Such specific discrimination would be justified only
by these narrow interests. A statute that applies generally to
all of the interests in administering a government program,
however, may be compelling outside national security or public
safety. 160
In addition to misapplying Lukumi, the court improperly
relied upon only one post-RFRA case in the face of strong
precedent to the contrary.161 The court appropriately examined
pre-Smith and post-RFRA case law,' 6 -- particularly bank-
ruptcy cases '63-which determined that both the Bankruptcy
156. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d
1407, 1419 (8th Cir. 1996).
157. Id. at 1419-20.
158. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
159. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1419.
160. See supra notes 26-31, 59, 62 and accompanying text (discussing cases
asserting compelling governmental interests beyond national security or pub-
lic safety).
161. In contrast to Reynolds, the Christians court does not engage in a his-
torical analysis discussing the role of fraudulent conveyances and bankruptcy
as an important feature of social life and undercuts the value of these histori-
cally important systems. See supra notes 16-21, 73-84 and accompanying text
(reviewing the historical basis of polygamy and the social goals, costs, and
benefits of filing bankruptcy).
162. The court noted previous case law indicates the government has a
compelling interest in maintaining the tax system, enforcing participation in
the social security system, maintaining national security and public safety,
and providing public education. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1419 (citations omit-
ted).
163. See, e.g., Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183
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Code as a whole and the fraudulent conveyance statute in par-
ticular served a compelling government interest. Despite its
awareness of these cases, the court failed to distinguish them
and stubbornly relied on In re Tessier to find that bankruptcy
is not a compelling interest. Even though In re Tessier deter-
mined RFRA- was unconstitutional, 16 Christians agreed with
In re Tessier that "'only those interests pertaining to the sur-
vival of the republic or the physical safety of its citizens'" can
constitute a compelling government interest. 6 Consequently,
despite the government's interests in providing debtors with a
fresh start and protecting the interests of creditors, Christians
determined that bankruptcy is not comparable to national se-
curity and public safety.1 66
Similarly, the court offered minimal persuasive argument
in its efforts to distinguish the Bankruptcy Code from the so-
cial security system and the Internal Revenue Code. Instead of
providing a reasoned analysis for its assertion that bankruptcy
is not comparable to these two systems, the court simply
agreed with In re Tessier16 7
The court supported its non-compelling interest conclusion
by narrowly focusing on the fact that creating an exception for
religious practices will only affect the Youngs' creditors.16 8 Yet,
if prior case law focused only upon the law's effects on indi-
viduals, instead of examining the overall maintenance and in-
tegrity of important governmental programs, those cases would
have reached completely different results. 69 By intentionally
B.R. 239, 251-52 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995), affd, 1996 WL 711319 (D. Kan. Nov.
26, 1996); In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348, 353 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
164. In re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396, 406-07 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995).
165. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1420 (citing In re Tessier, 190 B.R. at 405).
166. Id. Although the Christians court suggests it does not wish to inter-
pret the compelling government interest standard as narrowly as Tessier, in
effect, the court does. By carefully framing the issue in terms of whether
bankruptcy is "comparable to national security," Christians frames the appli-
cation of RFRA as resurrecting the high-water mark of national security that
was only articulated in United States v. Gillette. Id. Moreover, the court also
ignores that Tessier failed to adequately explain why Lee, Hernandez, and
Droz are not controlling precedent. In re Tessier, 190 B.R. at 401-02.
167. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1419-20. If the court had instead reasoned that
because the voluntary nature of filing a bankruptcy petition is more similar to
the voluntary nature of filing for unemployment benefits, this analysis would
have been more compelling. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
168. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1420.
169. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Droz v. Commissioner, 48 F.3d 1120 (9th
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ignoring the systemic ramifications upon bankruptcy law,
while simultaneously defining "compelling government inter-
est" with an incredibly high water mark, the Christians court
itself fails to provide a "compelling" analysis for why it followed
In re Tessier170
3. Least Restrictive Means
The Christians court effectively ends its analysis without
considering whether § 548(a)(2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling government interest. 71 The least re-
strictive means test is already incorporated in the determina-
tion of whether a government interest is compelling 72 and es-
sentially requires narrowly tailored government action. 73
C. A BETTER APPROACH: INTERPRETING RFRA AS A
FuNcTIONAL BALANCING TEST
Because the court applied RFRA without engaging in
meaningful statutory interpretation, future courts should not
follow its analysis. Accordingly, future courts should engage in
more detailed and comprehensive statutory interpretation and
use the canons of construction 74 to apply RFRA constitution-
ally within the context of bankruptcy.175
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 698 (1996).
170. Moreover, the Christians court also failed to consider the statutory
command of RFRA to implement the compelling interest test as modified by
prior court decisions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-(a)(5) (1994). By reinstating such a
stringent standard for evaluating a compelling government interest, Chris-
tians also ignores that the legislative history indicates RFRA was not meant
to reinstate the 'high water mark" of Sherbert and Yoder, but merely to re-
turn free exercise scrutiny to the level that existed prior to Smith. Anderson,
supra note 1, at 205 (citing H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 15 (1993)).
17L Christians, 82 F.3d at 1420.
172. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing use of the "least
restrictive alternative" test prior to Smith).
173. The Eighth Circuit itself has found these requirements to be synony-
mous. Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1554 (8th Cir. 1996).
174. Some schools of legislative interpretation rely primarily upon text
where the interpreter simply follows the ordinary meaning of the explicit
statutory language. While intentionalism attempts to follow the original in-
tent of the enacting legislature, purposivism involves choosing the best
method to carry out the specific purpose of the statute. WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 514 (2d ed. 1995).
175. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1416-20. But cf Rasmussen, supra note 81, at
535 (noting that despite the many alternative methods available "[tlhe Su-
preme Court has taken a turn toward text" in bankruptcy decisions).
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1. Textual Canons: Interpreting Purposes vs. Findings
The textual canons of interpretation are currently the pre-
ferred method of Supreme Court statutory analysis and, thus,
are the most commonly used strategy for interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code. 176 In contrast to the official statement of
purposes which promotes the Sherbert compelling interest
test,177 RFRA includes a statement of findings that indicates
"the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court
rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances be-
tween religious liberty and competing prior governmental in-
terests."178 Arguably, the plain meaning 17 9 of the text requires
these findings to modify RFRA's standard of review to include
more than the Sherbert test. Further, under the Whole Act
Rule,' 80 future courts should consider these findings to apply
more than the standard articulated in Sherbert and consider
other controlling federal court decisions.
Similarly, future courts should use the Rule to Avoid Sur-
plusage' to give more appropriate attention to RFRA's find-
ings and incorporate the limitations of cases such as Lee and
176. Rasmussen, supra note 81, at 538. Although other legitimate meth-
ods of interpretation are available, this Comment will focus primarily on in-
terpreting the direct language of RFRA by applying textual canons of con-
struction.
177. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the statement of
purposes set forth in RFRA).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (1994) (emphasis added).
179. Use of the "plain meaning" doctrine would have been particularly ap-
propriate since the court's analysis relied heavily upon RFRA's explicit lan-
guage. Justice Scalia and others have advocated that courts should construe
statutes according to their ordinary plain meaning. Antonin Scalia, Judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 3 DUKE L.J. 511, 511-12
(1989); see also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (noting
that where statutory meaning is "plain" there is no need for additional judicial
interpretation).
180. The Whole Act Rule enables statutory interpretation to look beyond a
particular clause and take into account the whole structure of the statute so
as to construe it to execute the will of the enacting legislature. See Kokoszka
v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) ("When interpreting a statute, the court
will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be
used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute....").
181. The Rule to Avoid Surplusage requires the court to construe statutory
provisions on the assumption that every phrase adds something to the mean-
ing of the statute. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988)
(indicating that it is a "cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provi-
sion should be construed to be entirely redundant"); Exxon Corp. v. Hung, 475
U.S. 355, 369 n.14 (1986) (noting that if two separate statutory commands are
not read "as a unit," one of the phrases is rendered superfluous).
[Vol. 81:9811008
1997] RFRA AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Hernandez.18 2 Similarly, applying the Rule Against Interpret-
ing One Provision to Negate Another," 3 future courts should
construe the "findings" and "purposes" of the Act together and
maximize the implementation of legislative intent. Although
both the "findings" and "purposes" are explicitly detailed
within the language of the statute, a congressional finding
holds more interpretive value because it is less abstract than a
general statement of purpose." In essence, although the
statement of "purposes" is very specific in its references to the
Sherbert and Yoder compelling interest test, the textual canons
require that "findings" modify the stated purposes of RFRA. In
this fashion, not only can future courts apply the compelling
interest test Congress desired, but they can also apply Sherbert
as modified by Lee and its progeny.18 5
Under this application, RFRA is not merely a rule requir-
ing strict scrutiny, but a rule which encourages functional
application and balancing. This interpretation also comports
with the plain meaning of RFRA.8 6 Because RFRA provides
for analysis comporting with Wisconsin v. Yoder, courts can en-
gage in the "balancing" process required by that case. 8 7
2. The Functional Balancing Test
By modifying the Sherbert test through the "prior Federal
court rulings,"188 a different application of RFRA is available.
Courts may broadly interpret "substantial burden" and "com-
pelling interest" instead of narrowly construing the terms to
182. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (detailing the issues in
Lee and Hernandez).
183. Under the Rule Against Interpreting One Provision td Negate An-
other, the court must interpret the statute so as to avoid negating or derogat-
ing other provisions of the statute. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v.
Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990) (noting that there is a "deep reluctance to
interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in
the same enactment").
184. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGIS-
LATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 514 (2d ed. 1995)
(discussing the superiority of using purpose in reading statutes).
185. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text (discussing the applica-
tion of a compelling governmental interest test to the maintenance of a tax
system).
186. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing the use of plain
meaning in reading statutes).
187. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing of
interests between religious practices and maintaining a tax system).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (1994).
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set rigid thresholds. In this fashion, courts can flexibly apply
RFRA as a functional balancing test that considers the nature
of the burden on religion, the burden of providing a religious
exemption, and the nature of the governmental interest.'89
This Comment suggests that even if courts fail to find a
traditional "substantial" burden, these courts can broadly label
a burden upon religious exercise as "substantial" in order to
weigh the burden in comparison to the nature of the govern-
ment interest. There must be limits to this broad construction,
however. For example, if there is merely a financial burden or
a retroactive action that does not affect current religious prac-
tices of religious debtors, 190 the consequences may not be direct
enough to create a burden upon religious exercise.1 91
Additionally, courts should broadly construe the term
"compelling government interest" to include bankruptcy. Ar-
guably, since one of the primary purposes of avoidance powers
is to increase the money available to unsecured creditors, the
concern for unsecured creditors is most apparent within the
context of fraudulent conveyance law.192 Historically, however,
fraudulent conveyance law and bankruptcy served other im-
portant government interests and constituted an "important
feature of social life."193
189. This functional balancing test implicitly incorporates the least re-
strictive means test into the balancing process of determining whether bur-
dens are "substantial" and interests are "compelling." See supra note 67 and
accompanying text (discussing the location of the least restrictive alternative
prong in the compelling governmental interests test).
190. See supra Part HI.B.2 (discussing application of a governmental in-
terest test to the Bankruptcy Code).
191. See supra note 52 (discussing the Goodall holding that a financial
burden is not "sulfstantial").
192. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of
bankruptcy and fraudulent transfer laws).
193. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text (discussing the distinc-
tion between religious practice and belief and how the Free Exercise Clause
was not meant to defeat regulation of the former). Moreover, that "important
feature" is not undercut by exemptions that affect the uniformity of the sys-
tem. Indeed, despite the vast number of exceptions within the Internal Reve-
nue Code, the Supreme Court still determined the maintenance of the tax sys-
tem was compelling. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 689 (1989).
If other precedent indicates that 70 years of implementing the Internal Reve-
nue Code is sufficient to sustain a compelling government interest, id.,
fraudulent conveyance and bankruptcy statutes in effect for over 200 years
should also be compelling. However, even if future courts do not find Rey-
nolds and Hernandez determinative, they must still admit that § 548 itself
contains no exceptions.
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Further, given the significant rise in the number of bank-
ruptcy filings over the past ten years, 194 the importance of ef-
fectively administering the bankruptcy system to an ever in-
creasing number of people is critical. Just as the Lee Court
expressed concern over administrative efficiency in applying
the largest government program, social security, to over 30
million people, 195 the Christians court should have recognized
the importance of administering another government system to
millions of people each year.196 Moreover, as cases such as
Lee' 97 and Goehring'9 indicate, the broad nature of services
provided by the Bankruptcy Code supports the notion that
bankruptcy administration is a compelling government inter-
est. 1
99
While commentators may be correct in noting that admin-
istrative efficiency should not be determinative when deciding
whether a government interest is compelling,2° the Bank-
ruptcy Code serves several other important functions. Provid-
ing debtors with a fresh start, keeping individuals from becom-
ing public charges, and maximizing both public and private
needs in maintaining a healthy economy are additional gov-
ernment interests underlying bankruptcy.2"1 Additionally, the
Founders specifically provided for congressional powers over
194. See supra notes 75 and accompanying text (discussing the threefold
increase in the number of bankruptcy petitions filed since 1980).
195. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (discussing the scope
and coverage of the social security program).
196. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing the scope
and number of people covered by bankruptcy laws in the United States).
197. See supra notes 26-28 (discussing the wide variety of services avail-
able under the social security program).
198. See supra note 72 (indicating the wide variety of services available
through a government program is often helpful in determining whether the
administration of the program constitutes a compelling government interest).
199. Aside from providing debtors with discharge from debts and assisting
financial reorganization, bankruptcy provides other critical services. See su-
pra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing the various goals of bank-
ruptcy law including giving debtors a fresh financial start in life).
200. Paulsen, supra note 45, at 278-83 (discussing retroactive application
of RFRA and the administrative problems that would follow from such appli-
cation).
201. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (discussing the underly-
ing policy goals of bankruptcy laws).
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bankruptcy.2 2 Given these factors, bankruptcy law plays a
critical role within contemporary American society.2 °3
Under a functional balancing test, even if one court holds
the interest in the Bankruptcy Code is insufficient to outweigh
the burden upon religious freedom, 204 other courts can still
consider the historical importance of bankruptcy, as well as in-
terests in ensuring a fresh start and protecting public and pri-
vate interests.205 Using this functional balancing approach, re-
storing the Sherbert test does not set a standard of review or a
rule of constitutional decisionmaking.2 6 This compromise acts
as a practical alternative that still allows the Supreme Court to
exercise its unique expertise and constitutional mandate to act
as the ultimate arbiter of meaning in the Constitution. Rather
than viewing RFRA as a legislative fiat, this functional balanc-
ing avoids the constitutional questions associated with
RFRA2°7 and permits courts greater flexibility to implement
this statute.
CONCLUSION
In Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, the
Eighth Circuit applied RFRA within the context of bankruptcy
law and inappropriately resurrected an overly stringent stan-
dard of judicial review. The Christians court failed to articu-
late why a statute affecting a completed religious practice con-
stitutes a "substantial burden" on religious activity. By
resurrecting a standard of review that only recognizes national
security as a "compelling interest," Christians fails to give ap-
propriate weight to the important nature of the bankruptcy
system. Instead of following Christians and requiring com-
202. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, c. 4.
203. See supra note 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing the impor-
tance of bankruptcy and fraudulent conveyance law).
204. This test will vary according to the severity of religious infringement
and the substantive governmental interest in each particular case.
205. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the policy and personal goals of bank-
ruptcy laws).
206. In this fashion, RFRA is not a "fatal in fact" unconstitutional con-
gressional exercise that negates Supreme Court precedent, but instead it al-
lows for a more flexible balancing of competing interests.
207. This is similar to the balancing test implicitly part of the reasoning in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, but it avoids setting the explicit standard of decision of
Sherbert which leads to severe constitutional questions. See supra notes 25-
35, 47 and accompanying text (discussing the problems associated with a gov-
ernmental interests test).
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plainants to satisfy rigid thresholds, future courts should use the
canons of construction to engage in a functional balancing test
and construe the competing provisions of RFRA together. Under
this approach, courts can maximize the intent of Congress by
weighing the competing interests of religious freedom to tithe
and administration of the bankruptcy system.

